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was guided to a considerable degree by mathematical conceptions, attempting to bring into logic the precision and standardization⁸ of deductive mathematics. Some of Bolzano's illustrations, however, emphasize the incompleteness of mathematical science in his time; for example, his interpretation of $\sqrt{-1}$ as an imaginary representation, on a par with a round square, presents a problem which has since been solved by the general theory of complex numbers.

It has been said that Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* prepared the way for a "phenomenological" method in logic and the theory of knowledge. From this point of view, a comparison of the *Wissenschaftslehre* with Husserl's "*Logische Untersuchungen*"⁹ and Meinong's "*Gegenstandstheorie*"¹⁰ facilitates an insight into these authors. It is instructive also to study Bolzano's work in its points of contact with Russell's "*Principles of Mathematics*." Although Russell has commented on the excellence of the "*Paradoxieen des Unendlichen*" it is strange that he does not seem explicitly to mention the *Wissenschaftslehre* in his book. Much of the ingenuity shown by Russell in discussing such problems as *meaning* and *denoting*, *propositional concept* (logical subject, verbal noun, and *proposition*, *whole* and *part*, *conceptual* and *real analysis* will be found to be characteristic of Bolzano. Striking differences between the two authors are contained in their views of the relevance of psychology to logic, the nature of relation, and the theory of subject and predicate. Russell,¹¹ has compared his doctrines with those of Frege. We are enabled to infer resemblances between Frege and Bolzano by means of the interesting controversy the former author has had with Korselt in the "*Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker Vereinigung*."¹²

A few words concerning Bolzano's historical importance may be added. It is doubtful whether Bolzano is the successor of Leibniz, as has been suggested. Nevertheless, he deserves to be associated with Leibniz and also Descartes, inasmuch as those great thinkers devoted themselves both to philosophy and mathematics without unfavorable discrimination and thus occupied a position which seems certain of a vigorous revival and promises to be of extraordinary fecundity for both disciplines.

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What Ought I to Do? An Inquiry into the Nature and Kinds of Virtue and into the Sanctions, Aims, and Values of the Moral Life. GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1915. Pp. 311.

This work is the second in a series of four volumes addressed rather to the larger educated public than to students of philosophy in the more restricted and technical sense. The first volume dealt with the problem

⁸ See, for instance, Bolzano, *loc. cit.*, page 509.

⁹ Cf. Vol. II., page 7; Vol. I., page 227.

¹⁰ Cf. the review by Professor Perry, this JOURNAL, Vol. XII., pages 301-305.

¹¹ *Loc. cit.*, pages vi, 501.

¹² Vol. 12 (1903), 15 (1906), 17 (1908).

of knowledge, and volumes are to follow upon the problem of faith—whether scientific, social, or religious; and in answer to a closely related problem—"What may I hope?"

At a time when moral values appear to many to be uncertain and insecure, and when a misty haze surrounds many if not most of the attempts to harmonize an acute social consciousness which has not precisely inquired as to what it means by society, with the claims of a strident individualism, we have become more modest in what we expect from such a book as this. Theoretically the volume does not throw much new light upon the problem of morals, but it has the practical value of insisting at this time upon the dignity of the individual life of virtue, as carrying with it its own sufficient value and sanction, and incidentally as the one efficient remedy for some of the evils of the day.

The first volume of the series was entitled, "What Can I Know?" The author states that the most conspicuous difference between the answer to that question and that to the question, "What ought I to do?" lies, not in the distinction between "knowing" and "doing," but rather in the distinction between "can" and "ought." Knowing is a kind of doing, and "high class, conscious doing" involves a large measure of cognitive activity. So the inquiry turns to the question of "oughtness," in which is involved conspicuously the distinction between the fact-that-is, and the idea-of-what-ought-to-be.

This distinction does not here yield the fruit which it might have yielded. The thought suggests itself that there is another great class of activity which is a kind of "doing" of a very conscious nature, and which distinguishes between a fact-that-is and an idea-of-what-might-be. In the relationship of the idea-of-what-ought-to-be of morals to the idea-of-what-might-be of creative art, if we may use the analogous term here for want of a better, there might be material for a fruitful inquiry into the nature of "oughtness."

The course of the author's inquiry leads elsewhere, however. "Oughtness" lies, not in an objective norm, but it is rather an obligation imposed from within by individual personality itself, and it is indeed one of the unique prerogatives incident to the ideal and promise of personality. The obligation to avoid certain kinds of conduct toward animals and things lies not in the things or animals, but rather in the obligation of personality to be true to its ideal of itself. The sense of moral obligation is, therefore, individual, or personal, but the content of the obligation is social in its origin. This moral instinct is, moreover, of the most important social significance "in securing a certain moral solidarity to the race." The consciousness of clash in modern society between personal and social claims upon conduct, which motivated so much of the literature of a decade just past, has enforced upon a science of conduct the necessity of attempting to find some principle in which the individual and the social claims may be harmonized. This fact is indicated in the drift of the writer's thought.

Again the parallel between the problem involved and that of artistic creation suggests itself. Obviously the idea-of-what-ought-to-be involves

the lives and fortunes and happiness of others in a way in which the idea-of-what-might-be of the artist is not taken generally to involve them. Moreover this proposition has a corollary in the fact that the so-called artistic temperament considers itself to be free from obligation to its fellows in a way which does not accord with our usual standards. If moral personality aims to create what ought to be, what relationship has its ideal to that of the artist, and does the solution of this problem throw any light upon the deeper social significance of morals as compared with the more individualistic significance of Art?

From the inquiry into the nature of "oughtness" and its individual and social significance, the volume proceeds to treat of more practical aspects of the problem—the separate virtues, whether there be any one comprehensive, all-including virtue, etc. The practical value of an habitual regard for all that is comprehended in the ideal of a good man, and the setting of this as the commanding task of individual life—the becoming that one good man whom I, with my particular talents and opportunities, may become; this and the fact that the being good is its own sufficient reason and reward, represent the drift of the argument in its application to individual, practical problems of conduct.

A final chapter is devoted to the relation between religion and morals. It becomes continually more evident as one reads this volume that for the writer the religious aims and sanctions and the moral aims and sanctions are in the last analysis one. When he attempts to answer the question as to whether there be one only virtue it becomes plain that, for him, if the virtues may be at all summed up in one command it is, "Be ye perfect as true sons of God." However, he seems unwilling to commit himself to a conclusion that the aims and sanctions of the moral life take their social beginning in religion, and find in it the inspiration which makes it possible for them to transcend themselves and set new and higher standards. In fact he does not commit himself to any more sweeping conclusion than this, that religion strengthens and supports the sanctions of moral life, and gives eternity to the values which it establishes, more particularly in so far as they can be identified with a world ground which is moral to the core. He hesitates to hint even, though he quotes Wundt somewhat to that effect (p. 283), that the social ideal, with its religious correlate, the Kingdom of Heaven, and moral ideals in general, have their origin in the religious consciousness.

Here again we are reminded that the parallel before suggested with creative art might be suggestive. There is certainly much in the religious phenomenon in so far as we know it which raises the question as to whether or not religion creates models and ideals of conduct in the sense that for Kant genius creates concrete embodiments of beauty, from which ethics formulates, or attempts to formulate, an internally consistent system, somewhat as the philosophical critic of art formulates canons or principles of criticism as based upon the works of artistic genius.

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